A friend in need is a friend indeed: Need-based sharing, rather than cooperative assortment, predicts experimental resource transfers among Agta hunter-gatherers by Smith, Daniel et al.
LSHTM Research Online
Smith, D; Dyble, M; Major, K; Page, AE; Chaudhary, N; Salali, GD; Thompson, J; Vini-
cius, L; Migliano, AB; Mace, R; (2018) A friend in need is a friend indeed: Need-
based sharing, rather than cooperative assortment, predicts experimental resource transfers
among Agta hunter-gatherers. Evolution and human behavior. ISSN 1090-5138 DOI:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.08.004
Downloaded from: http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/4649329/
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2018.08.004
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact researchonline@lshtm.ac.uk.
Available under license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/
https://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk
A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed: Need-Based Sharing, Rather than 
Cooperative Assortment, Predicts Experimental Resource Transfers 
among Agta Hunter-Gatherers
Daniel Smitha,b*, Mark Dyblec,d, Katie Majore, Abigail E Pagea, Nikhil Chaudharya, 
Gul Deniz Salalia, James Thompsona, Lucio Viniciusa, Andrea Bamberg Miglianoa,f, 
Ruth Macea,g*
a Department of Anthropology, University College London, London, WC1H 0BW, 
United Kingdom; 
b Bristol Medical School: Population Health Sciences, University of Bristol, Bristol, 
BS8 2BN, United Kingdom; 
c Jesus College, University of Cambridge, Jesus Lane, Cambridge, CB5 8BL, United 
Kingdom; 
d Department of Zoology, University of Cambridge, Downing Street, Cambridge, CB2 
3EJ, United Kingdom;
e Bristol Zoological Society, Bristol, BS8 3HA, United Kingdom; 
f Institute of Anthropology, Department of Biology, University of Zurich, Zurich, 
Switzerland;
g School of Life Sciences, Lanzhou University, Lanzhou, Gansu Province, 730000, 
China.
* Corresponding authors: daniel.smith.11@ucl.ac.uk & r.mace@ucl.ac.uk
Word count: 6,577 (excluding references)
Ethics
Ethical clearance was granted by the University College London Ethics Committee 
(UCL Ethics code 3086/003). Fieldwork permission was granted by local government 
units, including the Mayors of the Municipalities visited and from the Department of 
Environmental and Natural Resources (DENR) as the research took place in a 
protected area.
Data Availability
The data and code associated with this research is available via figshare at 
10.6084/m9.figshare.6960998 (this link will be made active upon publication).
Competing Interests
We have no competing interests.
Authors’ Contributions
A.B.M. and R.M. conceived the project; D.S., M.D., K.M., A.E.P. and A.B.M. 
collected the data; D.S. analysed the data; D.S., A.B.M., R.M., and L.V., wrote the 
manuscript with the help of all other authors. All authors contributed substantially to 
revisions and gave final approval for publication.
Acknowledgements
We thank the Agta communities and research assistants for their help and hospitality 
in the field.
Funding
This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust (grant no. RP2011 R045).
A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed: Need-Based Sharing, Rather than 
Cooperative Assortment, Predicts Experimental Resource Transfers 
among Agta Hunter-Gatherers
Abstract: Despite much theorizing, the evolutionary reasons why humans cooperate 
extensively with unrelated individuals are still largely unknown. While reciprocity 
explains many instances of non-kin cooperation, much remains to be understood. A 
recent suite of models based upon ‘cooperative assortativity’ suggest that non-kin 
cooperation can evolve if individuals preferentially assort with certain cooperative 
phenotypes, such as helping those who help others. Here, we test these assortative 
hypotheses among the Agta, a population of Filipino hunter-gatherers, using an 
experimental resource allocation game in which individuals divide resources 
between themselves and camp-mates. Individuals preferentially shared with less 
cooperative individuals, arguing against cooperative assortativity as a mechanism 
sustaining resource transfers in this population. Rather, sharing was often based on 
the recipient’s level of need, in addition to kin-based transfers and reciprocal sharing. 
Contrary to several recent theoretical accounts, in this real-world setting we find no 
evidence for cooperative assortativity influencing patterns of cooperation. These 
results may reflect the demands of living in a foraging ecology characterized by high 
resource stochasticity, necessitating need-based sharing as a system of long-term 
reciprocity to mitigate repeated subsistence shortfalls.
Keywords: Cooperation; Assortativity; Need-Based Sharing; Reciprocity; Hunter-
Gatherers; Experimental Games.
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1. Introduction
The question of why organisms display cooperative behavior – defined as a 
behavior which evolved to benefit others (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 2007b) – has 
been central to biology for over 50 years (Hamilton, 1964; Nowak, 2006). Although 
kin selection, where cooperation between relatives provides indirect fitness benefits 
(Hamilton, 1964), and reciprocity, where repeated cooperative interactions lead to 
greater long-term pay-offs than short-term defection (Trivers, 1971), explain many 
instances of cooperation throughout the animal kingdom (West, Griffin, & Gardner, 
2007a), they appear insufficient to explain the full range of observed cooperative 
behavior. This is especially true in humans where cooperation is often between 
unrelated individuals who, particularly in modern market-based economies, may not 
interact again in the future (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005).
One potential theory to explain the human propensity for cooperation is indirect 
reciprocity, which suggests that organisms may help others if this increases their 
reputation as a cooperative individual, resulting in greater cooperation from others in 
the future (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, 2005; Panchanathan & Boyd, 
2003). Crucially, the evolution of indirect reciprocity depends upon preferential 
cooperation towards these cooperative individuals (‘helping those who help others’). 
Theories such as competitive altruism (also known as ‘reputation-based partner 
choice’) make similar predictions, such that cooperative individuals should be 
preferentially cooperated with (Roberts, 1998; Sylwester & Roberts, 2013). However, 
the mechanisms are distinct; competitive altruism is based on the principle of 
signaling cooperativeness to form future mutually-beneficial cooperative ventures, 
while indirect reciprocity does not require future repeated interactions. Nonetheless, 
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both accounts are theories of ‘cooperative assortativity’, which suggest that 
cooperation can evolve if individuals preferentially cooperate with cooperative others.
In support of these theories, several lab studies have shown that cooperative 
individuals receive more help from others, even if they have never previously 
interacted (Milinski, 2016; Raihani & Barclay, 2016; Sylwester & Roberts, 2013). 
However, whether these patterns extend to real-world interactions where multiple 
forms of information can also be used on which to base cooperation, such as kinship 
or previous interactions, is largely an open question. Field studies have shown that 
individuals respond to threats to their reputation with increased cooperation (Yoeli, 
Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013), while sellers on eBay with a good reputation are 
more likely to attract customers (Livingston, 2005). However, whether people 
selectively cooperate with more cooperative individuals remains under-explored in 
real-world settings. Small-scale populations, where group sizes are small and acts of 
cooperation frequent – including food-sharing (Gurven, 2004), childcare (Hrdy, 
2009), cooperative foraging (Hill, 2002), labor-sharing (Jaeggi, Hooper, Beheim, 
Kaplan, & Gurven, 2016) and political coalitions (Patton, 2005) – are particularly 
useful to explore how factors such as cooperativeness, kinship, reciprocity, and other 
considerations, influence cooperative decision-making. Research in small-scale 
societies, particularly hunter-gatherers, may also provide insights regarding the 
social and ecological bases of human cooperative evolution prior to the development 
of agriculture and large-scale societies (Lee & Daly, 1999).  
In several foraging populations the most cooperative individuals, such as those 
who share the most food, do not necessarily receive more in return (Bliege Bird, 
Bird, Smith, & Kushnick, 2002; Kaplan & Hill, 1985). Among the Hadza, using a 
Public Goods Game to measure cooperation, the most cooperative individuals were 
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not more likely to be given resources or nominated as social partners (Apicella, 
Marlowe, Fowler, & Christakis, 2012). However, among Dominican bay oil 
producers, individuals with a reputation for cooperativeness were preferred 
recipients of cooperation (Macfarlan, Remiker, & Quinlan, 2012), while Hiwi who 
invested more time in foraging received more resources than others (Gurven, 2006). 
Although this pattern was not found among Ache foragers (Gurven, 2006), Ache who 
consistently provisioned others were more likely to receive resources when they 
were sick or injured (Gurven, Allen-Arave, Hill, & Hurtado, 2000). In summary, there 
is only partial support for models of cooperative assortativity in small-scale societies. 
A related theory also based on assortativity posits that cooperation can evolve 
if agents assort according to cooperative homophily; that is, cooperating with others 
of a similar cooperative level (Apicella et al., 2012). However, it is unclear why, in the 
absence of other mechanisms, non-cooperators would preferentially assort with 
other non-cooperators. While cooperative homophily is an outcome of the above 
processes based on cooperative assortment, via mechanisms such as ‘walk away’ or 
partner choice (Aktipis, 2004; Lewis, Vinicius, Strods, Mace, & Migliano, 2014; 
McNamara, Barta, Fromhage, & Houston, 2008), these mechanisms do not require 
that defectors actively seek out other defectors. Nonetheless, Hadza individuals 
were more likely to nominate to live and cooperate with others of a similar 
cooperative level to themselves, suggesting that assortativity by cooperative 
homophily may occur and is not merely an outcome of other assortative processes 
(Apicella et al., 2012). There are therefore two pathways by which cooperative 
assortment may facilitate the evolution of cooperation: cooperating with the most 
cooperative individuals (indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism) and 
cooperating with others of a similar cooperative level (cooperative homophily).
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As discussed above, contrary to expectations based on cooperative 
assortativity in several populations the most cooperative individuals are not preferred 
cooperative partners. This behavior may reflect need-based sharing, where those in 
greater need receive more assistance (Aktipis, Cronk, & de Aguiar, 2011). In studies 
of forager food-sharing, those with a larger family or with low calorific production 
relative to family consumption, and therefore in greater need, tend to receive more 
resources (Allen-Arave, Gurven, & Hill, 2008; Gurven, Hill, Kaplan, Hurtado, & Lyles, 
2000), while Agta foragers were more likely to receive resources from others if they 
were unable to procure resources on a given day (Dyble et al., 2016). Consistent 
with this, Agta in less need were more cooperative in an experimental game (Smith 
et al., 2016), while lower socioeconomic status has been associated with reduced 
cooperation in developed countries (Silva & Mace, 2014). Similarly, in an 
experimental game among Fijians, the most common reason for sharing was the 
relative need of the recipient (Gervais, 2017). 
However, in the absence of other mechanisms need-based sharing is a 
description of cooperation, not an adaptive evolutionary explanation; a strategy of 
altruistic donations to those in need, without any subsequent future fitness gain, is 
unlikely to be selected for. This situation is comparable to the ‘Banker’s Paradox’ 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1996), where the individuals most in need of a loan (or 
resources) are the least likely to receive them because they are a greater ‘credit risk’ 
and less likely to repay the loan. Nonetheless, these observed need-based transfers 
may be adaptive if they reflect direct reciprocity, where individuals with resources 
help those in need – as the costs to giving are low and the benefits to the recipient 
are high – which may be reciprocated in the future (Trivers, 1971). Although 
research on forager food-sharing has indicated the presence of need-based 
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transfers (Allen-Arave et al., 2008; Gurven, 2004; Hooper, Gurven, Winking, Kaplan, 
& Hooper, 2015), from these observational studies it is difficult to assess whether 
these patterns are a result of giving to those in need (i.e., cooperation) or needy 
individuals taking resources from those with more resources, as predicted by models 
of tolerated theft (Blurton Jones, 1987; Winterhalder, 1996). Experimental studies 
which dissociate unsolicited giving from tolerated theft can be used to help answer 
these questions.
Here we explore resource transfers among Agta hunter-gatherers to test 
predictions of indirect reciprocity/competitive altruism and cooperative homophily. 
We use a novel experimental game in which resources are divided between self and 
known camp-mates. Using this approach, we previously found that individuals 
preferentially shared resources with both kin and reciprocal partners (Smith et al., 
2016). We now extend this analysis to explore how an individual’s cooperativeness 
influences their probability of receiving resources from others. Specifically, we test 
whether the Agta: i) preferentially share resources with cooperative individuals (in 
line with theories of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism); and ii) share 
resources with others of a similar cooperative level (as predicted by cooperative 
homophily).
2. Methods
2.1. Ethnographic Background
This study focuses on two Agta sub-populations, the Palanan Agta (~1,000 
individuals) and the Maconacon Agta (~250 individuals) from the remote Northern 
Sierra Madre Natural Park in northeast Luzon, the Philippines. They subsist 
predominantly as hunter-gatherers, engaging in hunting, fishing and gathering of wild 
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resources, but also in wage or agricultural labor when available. Of the time spent in 
economic activities, 77% concerned foraging behavior, predominantly fishing (54%), 
but also gathering (20%) and hunting (3%), while the remaining 23% of time was 
spent engaged in non-foraging behavior, such as cultivation (13.5%) and wage labor 
(9.5%; Page et al., 2016). Game and fish are traded with local agricultural non-Agta 
populations for rice, other carbohydrates and luxury goods. Food-sharing is a regular 
daily occurrence (Dyble et al., 2016). Camp sizes vary between solitary dwellings 
(seven individuals) to large camps with 26 houses (156 individuals), with an average 
of seven houses (49 individuals).
2.2. Data Collection
An experimental resource allocation game – the ‘Sharing Game’ (SG) – was 
played with 290 Agta (mean age=37, range=16-70, males=140) from 18 camps (324 
Agta were included as potential recipients, but 34 Agta did not play the game due to 
either moving camp or subsequently deciding not to take part). Participants were 
shown their own picture, along with a maximum of 10 other randomly-selected adults 
from camp (individuals from camps with ≤10 other camp-mates were shown all other 
adults) and given a number of small wooden tokens (each representing 125g of rice; 
approximately a meal for one individual) equal to the number of camp-mate photos 
(i.e., in a camp of 11 individuals (10 camp-mates plus ego) each player would be 
given 10 tokens, while in a camp of nine individuals (eight camp-mates plus ego) 
each player would be given eight tokens). This was chosen so that not all pictures, 
including ego, could receive rice. For each token, participants had to decide whether 
to keep the rice (placing the token on their own picture) or give it to a camp-mate of 
their choosing (placing the token on the camp-mate’s picture). For each resource 
given, participants were asked why that recipient was selected. This was repeated 
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until no tokens remained. Prior to leaving camp, the amount of rice earned by each 
participant was given to them (the amount they kept for themselves plus the amount 
they received from others). 
Decisions were made in private, with just the experimenter, translator and 
participant aware of an individual’s decisions. Other camp-mates were not made 
aware of any other player’s decisions. The experimenter read the game instructions 
in English, which were then translated into the participant’s local language (Tagalog, 
Paranan or Ilocano). All field assistants were trained prior to fieldwork to ensure that 
they understood the game rationale and procedures. Approximately ten days were 
spent at each Agta camp. Upon entering the camp, Agta were informed that 
experimental sharing games would be played with all consenting adult members of 
the camp. Games were conducted on the last few days in order to maximize 
familiarity with the researchers and facilitate trust, but also to minimize the potential 
for collusion between camp-mates. We do not believe that this occurred, as there 
were no sudden shifts in game behavior over time.
This non-anonymous game structure was used to assess both levels of 
cooperative behavior and patterns of cooperation (i.e. who individuals share with, 
such as kin or those who shared reciprocally). The game is similar to the ‘Gift Game’ 
conducted in several populations (Apicella et al., 2012; Chaudhary et al., 2015; He, 
Wu, Ji, Tao, & Mace, 2016; Thomas, Næss, Bårdsen, & Mace, 2015) where 
participants are given resources (e.g. sticks of honey) and have to decide who to 
give it to. Although the game used here is structurally alike, it possesses the added 
rule that participants could either keep a share for themselves if they wished or give 
it to a camp-mate of their choosing. Although the Gift Game allows the choice of 
giving to multiple individuals, it does not measure levels of cooperation as there is no 
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option for keeping gifts for one’s self, meaning that there is no conflict between 
individual and group interests. On the other hand, although traditional economic 
games, such as the Ultimatum Game, Dictator Game, and Public Goods Game, 
measure levels of cooperation, they include only anonymous partners, and therefore 
ignore the role that differences in relationship have on cooperation (Rucas, Gurven, 
Kaplan, & Winking, 2010) and cannot be used to explore who individuals 
preferentially share resources with. 
After preliminary trials with different resources, it was decided that rice would 
be used as the game resource as it is highly sought-after by the Agta and therefore 
carries enough value to cause a dilemma when deciding whether to share or not. 
Initial trials with other goods, such as honey sticks, were perceived to have little 
value (and were freely distributed to children). After discussing with the Agta which 
resources were most valued, rice was the unanimous choice. The Agta do not grow 
their own rice (although they may harvest it for neighboring agricultural populations), 
and although it is a non-foraged commodity introduced by non-Agta agricultural 
populations it is one of the Agta’s primary sources of calories (when available) and is 
highly valued. 
2.3. Statistical Analyses
The response variable was coded in a matrix as ‘1’ if ego (the giver) gave to 
alter (the recipient) and ‘0’ if not (note that although givers could theoretically donate 
more than one gift to a single recipient, in practice only one individual gave two 
tokens to the same individual, hence the use of a binary term here). Between-camp 
dyads and camp-mates not presented to ego were coded as missing. The main 
independent variable of interest was ‘alter cooperation score’, reflecting the 
recipient’s level of cooperativeness. Each individual possessed a score (between 0% 
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and 100%) indicating the percent of gifts donated to others, with 0% meaning no 
resources shared with camp-mates (all gifts kept for self) and 100% meaning all 
resources shared with camp-mates (no gifts kept for self). For each individual this 
was centered around the mean for each camp (camp mean minus individual score), 
so that between-camp differences in cooperation did not confound within-camp 
sharing patterns. Individuals with a positive score gave more than others in camp 
(i.e., they were more cooperative than the camp average). ‘Cooperative homophily’ 
was also included as a predictor variable to explore whether individuals gave to 
others of a similar cooperative level. This was constructed by assessing the 
difference in cooperativeness between ego and alter. For instance, a difference of ‘0’ 
meant that both individuals gave the same, while ’30’ indicated a difference, 
irrespective of direction, of 30 percentage points between ego and alter. As reported 
previously (Smith et al., 2016), the average amount of rice kept in the Sharing Game 
was 62.6% (SD=30.5), which varied considerably between camps, with individuals 
from the most cooperative camp keeping on average only 26.8% of rice for 
themselves, while in the least cooperative camp no camp-mates shared any 
resources (figure 1 in ibid.).
Following similar methodologies in other hunter-gatherer populations (Apicella 
et al., 2012), we make the assumptions that: i) individuals know who the most 
cooperative people are; and ii) that this is reflected in how much individuals share in 
the game. Given that the Agta have known their camp-mates for most of their lives 
we believe that the first assumption is plausible. Decisions about an individual’s 
trustworthiness are made within a fraction of a second (Willis & Todorov, 2006), 
while strangers could predict who would cooperate after interacting for only 30 
minutes (Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993). Multiple years of exposure are likely to 
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result in more accurate judgments regarding cooperativeness among the Agta. 
Secondly, although traditional economic games, such as the Ultimatum, Dictator or 
Public Good Games, often have questionable external validity (Gurven & Winking, 
2008; Winking & Mizer, 2013; although see Peysakhovich, Nowak, & Rand, 2014), 
we have previously demonstrated that these contextualized non-anonymous games 
among the Agta mirror real-world food-sharing decisions (Smith et al., 2016; see also 
Gervais, 2017). Individuals from camps who shared food reciprocally in the real-
world were both more likely to share resources in these games and to share these 
experimental resources reciprocally, consistent with the idea that reciprocal sharing 
requires producer control with individuals willing to share resources with others 
(Smith et al., 2016). This suggests that the Agta’s levels of cooperativeness in this 
game likely reflect cooperativeness in the real-world, at least regarding food-sharing 
decisions, providing some confidence that the second assumption is also valid.
Additional variables included: kinship relation between ego and alter, 
reciprocity, proximity, age (of ego, alter, and age difference) and sex (of ego, alter, 
and whether same or different sex). Kinship relations were defined as: primary kin 
(PK), with a relatedness coefficient of r=0.5 to ego; distant kin (DK), with a 
relatedness coefficient between r=0.03125 (second cousins) and r=0.25 to ego; 
spouse; spouse’s primary kin/primary kin’s spouse (SPK/PKS); spouse’s distant 
kin/other affines (SDK/OA), which includes distant kin of spouse or other affinal 
relationships up to five steps away from ego (e.g., spouse’s brother’s wife’s mother); 
and non-relatives (NR), which includes everyone else without a kinship link to ego 
(see Dyble et al., 2015 for further details). Each of these categories was compared 
relative to resources given to non-kin. The matrix for reciprocity was the transpose of 
the response variable (i.e., whether alter gave to ego), from which it is possible to 
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assess whether individuals were more likely to share with camp-mates who also 
shared with them. Although decisions in this game were made without knowing how 
others behaved, we justify this definition of ‘reciprocity’ by noting that reciprocity 
requires individuals sharing with camp-mates who they expect to share back in 
return, which can be assessed using this experimental design. Proximity was coded 
from one to four, reflecting increasing physical distance between ego and alter, with 
categories of: living in the same house as ego (1); living in the house next to ego (2); 
having a house between ego’s and alter’s (3); and living further away (4).
In order to ensure that patterns of resource transfers were not confounded by 
the amount an individual distributed, ego’s cooperative score (% donated to others) 
was included as a control variable in all models. As a consequence of the game 
structure, reciprocity could not be measured for all individuals in larger camps, 
resulting in 1,312 dyads (out of a total 2,752) containing the reciprocity variable. 
Similarly, as not all 324 potential recipients played the game, alter cooperativeness 
and cooperative homophily scores were only available for 2,530 dyads. Of these 
1,312 dyads, the number of potential recipients in each kinship category is displayed 
in table S1. Note also that even though 290 Agta participated in these games, these 
analyses include only the 272 individuals with at least one potential reciprocal 
partner.
Analyses were conducted using the statistical software R 3.5.0 (R 
Development Core Team, 2018). A generalized estimation equation (GEE) approach 
was utilized to control for repeated data from the same individual (Zeger & Liang, 
1986). Logistic regressions exploring whether ego gave to alter were conducted on 
vectors containing the variables described above. Due to GEE analyses not utilizing 
full-likelihood estimates, quasi-likelihood information criterion estimates (QIC; Pan, 
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2001) were employed to compare model fit. A global model was constructed first 
containing all variables described above. Keeping ego cooperative score, age and 
sex constant in all models as control variables, all possible combinations of models 
containing the theoretically-relevant variables (kinship, reciprocity, proximity, alter 
cooperativeness, and cooperative homophily) were constructed and QIC values 
compared.  Models within two QIC values of the top model were subsequently put 
forward for model averaging to account for model uncertainty and identify the factors 
most strongly associated with receiving resources (see ‘Supplementary Information’ 
for further details of this model comparison approach). All models contained the 
same 1,312 dyads to ensure that QIC values were comparable between models. 
Continuous input variables were standardized over two standard deviations 
(SDs; Gelman, 2008). This standardization allows direct comparison of effect sizes 
between both continuous and binary variables, as well as between continuous 
variables on different scales. Unless otherwise stated, standardized estimates are 
used in text, while standardized and unstandardized estimates are displayed in 
tables (although only unstandardized coefficients are biologically meaningful; 
Schielzeth, 2010). To facilitate comprehension of effect sizes, log-odd coefficients 
are converted to odds ratios (OR) in text. Odds ratios for binary or categorical 
variables are compared to the reference, while odds ratios for continuous variables 
reflect a 2 SD difference.  
3. Results
Out of 1,312 potential recipients, 492 received resources (37.5%). Of the 32 
candidate models, those within two QIC values of the top model are displayed in 
table 1. After model averaging, kinship, reciprocity and alter cooperativeness were 
each associated with sharing resources (figure 1; see also table S2 for log-odds 
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estimates and confidence intervals). Consistent with a previous publication (Smith et 
al., 2016), primary kin (OR=4.01) and distant kin (OR=1.78) were more likely to 
receive resources than non-kin, while individuals also displayed reciprocity, as they 
were more likely to nominate others who also gave to them (OR=1.68).  
A strong effect of alter cooperative score was reported, with individuals 
increasingly likely to give to less cooperative individuals (figure 1). A 2 SD decrease 
in alter cooperativeness was associated with an approximately 50% increase in the 
likelihood of alter receiving resources (OR=1.58). No effects of cooperative 
homophily or proximity were found. Other predictive effects included alter age, with a 
2 SD increase in recipient age raising the probability of being given to by nearly 50% 
(OR=1.49), and sex-similarity, with individuals of the same sex nearly twice as likely 
to receive resources relative to opposite sex dyads (OR=1.89).
In order to explore whether this effect of sharing with less cooperative camp-
mates varied by relatedness we compared the baseline global model (containing all 
variables) to a model containing an interaction term between alter cooperativeness 
and kinship. Compared to the global model, inclusion of an alter cooperativeness by 
kinship interaction term resulted in a reduced model fit (global model QIC=1090.3; 
interaction model QIC=1097), indicating that the effect of giving to less cooperative 
individuals was approximately equivalent across all kinship categories.
Although GEE models control for repeated observations of givers, they do not 
control for repeated observations of recipients, which has the potential to bias 
parameter estimates due to the structural non-independence of the data. Therefore, 
to test the robustness of these results logistic mixed-effect models with both givers 
and receivers as random effects were constructed and an identical model averaging 
approach performed. This model is qualitatively identical to that of the GEE model, 
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demonstrating the validity and robustness of these results (Table S3). Additionally, in 
a simplified model containing just ego cooperative score as a fixed effect, along with 
givers and receivers as random effects, the inclusion of camp as an additional 
random effect did not improve model fit (camp-level random effect model 
AIC=1125.8; model without camp-level random effect AIC=1123.8). This indicates 
that any residual clustering of cooperative decision-making based on camp 
membership is minimal and unlikely to bias parameter estimates, further highlighting 
the robustness of the above findings. 
3.1. Effect of Need on Resource Transfers
As discussed in the introduction, in several small-scale societies sharing with 
less cooperative individuals (e.g., those who share less food than others) may 
indicate need-based sharing. To directly explore the effect of need on resource 
transfers, additional models were constructed using a composite ‘recipient need’ 
variable, based on data from outside the game context. This was based on: i) 
number of dependent offspring (those aged 15 or younger, as assessed from 
genealogical interviews), as the amount of resources necessary to support a family 
increases with the number of non-producing consumers in a household (Hill & 
Hurtado, 2009); ii) resource availability (whether the household had any rice stored, 
as assessed from household questionnaires), and iii) an age component, with all 
individuals under 40 years of age treated as equally needy, followed by a monotonic 
increase in need after this age. This age component was chosen because foraging 
returns among hunter-gatherers tend to decline after this age (Dyble et al., 2016; Hill 
& Hurtado, 2009), rates of morbidity and mortality increase (Kaplan, Hill, Lancaster, 
& Hurtado, 2000) and individuals become weaker and more dependent on others 
(Draper & Harpending, 1994), all of which are indicative of being in greater need. 
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Comparable measures of need have been utilized in other studies exploring food-
sharing and cooperation more generally (e.g., Gurven, Hill, et al., 2000; Hames & 
McCabe, 2007; Thomas et al., 2018).
Continuous variables of family size and age were standardized over 2 SDs to 
make them comparable with the binary resource availability variable (which was 
standardized around its mean; Gelman, 2008). The average of these three 
standardized variables was then taken to estimate an individual’s level of need, with 
a greater value indicating greater need. To demonstrate the validity of this composite 
need variable, a linear regression controlling for sex found that individuals in need 
were lighter than less-needy individuals, with a one unit increase in need predicting a 
2.75 kilogram decrease in weight (95% CI: [-0.43; -5.06], p=0.02, n=276). Alter age 
was also removed from subsequent analyses to avoid confounding with need, as the 
two are highly correlated (r=0.66, p<0.001, n=324). 
Compared to a baseline model containing all predictor variables other than 
need, the model with alter need possessed a superior model fit, over two QIC values 
lower than the baseline (baseline model QIC=1093.3; need model QIC=1089.6). This 
model found that individuals in greater need were more likely to receive resources 
(b=0.73, 95% CI: [0.18; 1.29]), with a one unit increase in need associated with being 
over twice as likely to receive resources (OR=2.08). Note that in this model we still 
find an effect of sharing with less cooperative individuals (b=-0.01, 95% CI: [-0.002; -
0.017]). This effect of need appears largely due to sharing with older individuals, as if 
the age component is removed from the composite need variable (keeping just 
number of dependent offspring and stored resources) then the effect of need on 
sharing, although still in the predicted direction, is much weaker (b=0.3, 95% CI: [-
0.19; 0.79]). Compared to the model including need, we also find that that an 
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interaction term between need and kinship does not increase model fit (need model 
QIC=1089.6; interaction model QIC=1096.3), suggesting that this need-based 
sharing is directly towards kin and non-kin with equal frequency.
3.2. Reasons for Giving in the Sharing Game
We also asked why individuals gave to recipients, resulting in 1,001 answers. 
These were categorized according to various criteria relevant to the evolution of 
cooperation, such as kinship, reciprocity, need, and personal qualities, among others 
(figure 2 and table S4; for a similar procedure, see Gervais, 2017; Thomas et al., 
2015). The most common reason for selecting an individual was genetic relatedness, 
accounting for over one-quarter of all nominations, while affinal relatedness 
accounted for one-sixth of all nominations. Collectively, over 40% of reasons given 
were based on kinship. The second largest category (~25% of nominations) was 
need-based sharing, including reasons such as old age, pregnancy, having many 
children, weakness, inability to work, having no food, or simply to help them. Around 
one in ten nominations referred to reciprocity between ego and alter. Personal 
qualities, such as kindness, leadership and generosity, although present, were less 
frequently mentioned (8.4%).  
4. Discussion
These results demonstrate that experimental resource transfers among the 
Agta do not conform to predictions made by theories of cooperative assortativity. We 
fail to find evidence for both indirect reciprocity and cooperative homophily; 
individuals were neither more likely to select cooperative partners or those of a 
similar cooperative level. Rather, the Agta preferentially shared with less cooperative 
individuals, which may reflect need-based sharing. Accordingly, we also demonstrate 
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that individuals in need, particularly older Agta, were more likely to receive resources 
(although an independent effect of sharing with less cooperative individuals was still 
reported). This finding is bolstered by a qualitative analysis of the reasons individuals 
gave for sharing, with approximately one-quarter of all reasons coded as need- or 
helping-based (figure 2). Personal qualities, including kindness and generosity, 
alongside other competencies such as leadership and foraging skills, were 
mentioned three times less frequently than need-based reasons. The Agta may 
therefore use reputations for kindness or generosity to some extent when deciding to 
share with others, but sharing based on need appears to take precedence. 
Since need-based sharing is a description of cooperation, not an adaptive 
explanation, understanding the evolutionary function of these patterns is essential. 
The lack of interaction between need and kinship suggests that resources in this 
game were given to needy camp-mates regardless of relatedness, meaning that 
indirect fitness benefits via kin selection cannot solely explain this need-based 
sharing. Comparable results were reported among Ache foragers where need, 
irrespective of relatedness, predicted real-world food-sharing (Allen-Arave et al., 
2008). As there was no possibility of individuals taking resources from others, the 
current results also suggest that need-based sharing is not solely a consequence of 
tolerated theft (although other aspects of need-based transfers outside this 
experimental context may be explained by this). One potential functional explanation 
concerns reciprocity, but on a longer time-scale than assessed here (although an 
immediate effect of reciprocity was also observed). For instance, by helping those in 
need now, where the costs to the actor are low and the benefits to the recipient high, 
in the future where the roles may be reversed the former recipient may reciprocate 
(Trivers, 1971). This may be particularly important in hunter-gatherer contexts where 
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individual stochasticity in resource acquisition is high, combined with a life history 
where in families with many dependent offspring are frequently at a net deficit and in 
need of resources (Hill & Hurtado, 2009). The concept of resource value, rather than 
resource quantity, is pertinent here, as the same quantity of food has greater value 
for a needy, compared to a satiated, individual (Gurven, 2006). Taking this value 
asymmetry into consideration, rather than models where pay-offs are constant, 
greatly expands the potential for reciprocal cooperation to evolve (Doebeli & 
Knowlton, 1998). This implies that the quantities shared between individuals do not 
need to be identical, as long as the long-term resource values are equal (Gurven, 
2006). For example, skilled hunters Ache who provisioned others received 
significantly more food while sick or injured relative to less-skilled hunters who 
provisioned others less often (Gurven, Allen-Arave, et al., 2000), while reciprocal 
non-kin sharing among vampire bats likely reflects similar evolutionary processes 
(Carter & Wilkinson, 2013). This long-term reciprocity based on asymmetrical pay-
offs characterizes the need-based sharing observed among friends (Hruschka, 
2010), thereby resolving the ‘Banker’s Paradox’ (Tooby & Cosmides, 1996) and 
illustrating how non-kin cooperation – and friendship (Migliano et al., 2017) – can 
evolve. 
Other functional reasons for this need-based sharing are also possible if 
benefits are not returned ‘in-kind’. For instance, ‘unconditional generosity’ towards 
those in need may be a sexually selected strategy to exhibit one’s phenotypic value 
by displaying qualities such as care, compassion and generosity to attract mates 
(Raihani & Smith, 2015). ‘Charitable’ donations may also enhance one’s social 
standing, resulting in increased support in coalitions (Milinski, Semmann, & 
Krambeck, 2002; Patton, 2005) or cooperative hunting (Bliege Bird & Power, 2015). 
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While the benefits of being cooperative may not be apparent in the short-term ‘in-
kind’ cooperative measure used here, a longer-term perspective investigating 
several different cooperative and fitness-relevant domains may highlight these 
benefits. Alternatively, other competencies such as foraging skill, leadership, 
storytelling prowess or knowledge may be more important in deciding with whom to 
interact and cooperate, rather than solely an individual’s level of cooperativeness 
(Macfarlan & Lyle, 2015; Smith et al., 2017). 
Although we find evidence for need-based sharing, an independent effect of 
sharing with less cooperative individuals was still reported. One possible reason for 
this is that our measure of need does not encompass all relevant components of 
need, such as being pregnant, nursing young infants (Hurtado, Hill, Hurtado, & 
Kaplan, 1992), or being ill/injured (Sugiyama & Chacon, 2000). Many of the stated 
reasons for sharing resources with those in need, including weakness and an 
inability to work, could not be explicitly included in our composite need variable due 
to a lack of quantitative data. Given the association between cooperativeness and 
other components of need (Smith et al., 2016), it is plausible that inclusion of these 
other factors may remove the residual effect of sharing with less cooperative 
individuals. Alternatively, perhaps there are reasons, other than need, why 
individuals would avoid sharing with cooperative individuals. For instance, foragers 
may shun highly-cooperative individuals to avoid being indebted to them (Woodburn, 
1982), comparable to societies from Papua New Guinea rejecting over-generous 
offers in the Ultimatum Game (Henrich et al., 2005).   
Our results suggest that mechanisms of cooperative assortativity may not 
have universal application as explanations for the evolution of human cooperation.  
There are several kinds of assortativity, however, not just by cooperativeness, which 
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prioritize specific partners over others. Cooperation in this experimental game is 
associated with assortativity by kinship and reciprocal partnerships, but in different 
contexts other assortative mechanisms may take precedence. For instance, in many 
large-scale societies kinship ties are weaker and interactions repeated less 
frequently, meaning that kin selection and reciprocal cooperation may be weaker 
forces in these contexts. Under these circumstances, mechanisms of cooperative 
assortment, such as indirect reciprocity, may become more important (as the 
proliferation of online seller rating systems attests; Livingston, 2005). As a concrete 
example of cross-cultural variation in cooperative strategies, both hunter-gatherer 
(Gurven, 2004) and pastoral (Aktipis et al., 2011) societies, which suffer repeatedly 
from resource shortfalls due to high levels of stochasticity in food production, appear 
to display need-based sharing as a risk-pooling strategy. In contrast, among the 
agricultural Mosuo in China needier households were not more likely to receive help 
(Thomas et al., 2018), potentially because the unpredictable variability in resource 
production required for reciprocal need-based cooperation to evolve is less 
pronounced in farming communities. Further cross-cultural research is required to 
explore how cooperative mechanisms vary with socioecological context. 
These findings also have implications for models which use lab studies to 
investigate the evolution of cooperation. In many previous experimental studies 
supporting predictions made by theories of cooperative assortativity (Milinski, 2016; 
Milinski et al., 2002) the theory is examined in isolation. Yet, as demonstrated here, 
once other factors such as relatedness, reciprocity and need are taken into 
consideration in a real-world setting, individuals use these traits, rather than cues of 
cooperativeness, when deciding with whom to cooperate. Laboratory studies are 
useful proofs-of-concept, but real-world data are necessary to assess their predictive 
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power in ecologically valid contexts and to understand the social and ecological 
factors which influence cooperative behavior.
These findings suggest that need-based sharing, rather than cooperative 
assortativity, predicts patterns of experimental resource transfers among the Agta. 
However, these results possess several limitations. Firstly, we only explore one 
domain of cooperation (food-sharing). It is possible that cooperative assortativity may 
explain patterns of cooperation in other contexts, such as labor-sharing (Macfarlan et 
al., 2012), cooperative hunting (Bliege Bird & Power, 2015), child-care or selecting 
camp-mates (Apicella et al., 2012). Studies exploring multiple cooperative networks 
within a single society (see, for example, Jaeggi et al., 2016; Mace et al., 2018; 
Nolin, 2011) are required to explore this possibility. Nonetheless, the present results 
demonstrate that cooperative assortment is unlikely to influence ‘in-kind’ food-
sharing decisions among the Agta.
Additionally, the present study does not aim to explore all facets of reputation-
based cooperation. For instance, we do not assess whether individuals shared food 
in this game in order to gain a reputation for being cooperative, or how market 
effects of supply and demand influence cooperative decision-making (Barclay, 
2013). Rather, we assume that individuals already possess a reputation for 
cooperativeness in real-world interactions and test whether these individuals are 
more likely to receive resources. This is a central prediction of all theories of 
cooperative assortativity. Further studies are required to explore how individuals 
earn a cooperative reputation and the additional nuances of cooperation in biological 
markets.
In addition to kin selection and immediate reciprocity, we therefore conclude 
that resource transfers among the Agta are largely based on need, rather than 
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mechanisms of cooperative assortment such as indirect reciprocity or cooperative 
homophily. This need-based sharing may represent delayed reciprocity or helping 
needy individuals for reputational benefits in other domains. This is likely due to a 
forager-specific ecology of high resource stochasticity resulting in repeated food 
shortfalls, necessitating need-based sharing as a system of long-term reciprocal 
exchange. These results therefore indicate that mechanisms of cooperative 
assortativity may not have universal application as explanations for the evolution of 
human cooperation, particularly prior to the advent of increasingly-anonymized 
interactions in large-scale societies.
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Table 1:  Comparison of the top models (within two QIC values of the best-fitting 
model) regarding who individuals gave resources to (n=272, dyads=1,312). Keeping 
age, sex and ego cooperativeness variables constant, 32 potential models were 
constructed and QIC values compared using all combinations of the variables: 
kinship, reciprocity, proximity, alter cooperativeness and cooperative homophily. 
ΔQIC denotes the difference in QIC values between models (with ‘0’ being the top 
model), while model weight is a value between 0 and 1 which can be interpreted as 
the probability that a given model is the best fit to the data.  
Model Variables QIC ΔQIC Model Weight (wi)
Kinship + Reciprocity + Alter 
Cooperativeness 1086.25 0 0.72
Kinship + Reciprocity + Alter 
Cooperativeness + Cooperative 
Homophily
1088.18 1.92 0.28
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Figure 1: Forest plot displaying standardized log-odds estimates of giving resources 
to others, derived from the model averaging analysis (table S2; n=272, dyads=1,312; 
see table 1 for component models). Note that not all variables are displayed. 
Abbreviations: PK=Primary kin; DK=Distant kin; NR=Non-relatives. Error bars denote 
95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2: Pie chart displaying the proportion of reasons, split by category, for giving 
to others (total reasons=1,001: for additional details see table S4).
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Supplementary Information for ‘A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed: 
Need-based Sharing, Rather than Cooperative Assortment, Predicts 
Experimental Resource Transfers among Agta Hunter-Gatherers’
Details of the ‘Model Comparison’ Statistical Approach Used
This section briefly details the ‘Information Theoretic’ (IT) approach used in 
this paper. IT approaches are distinct from traditional ‘null hypothesis significance 
testing’ approaches (also known as ‘frequentist’ methods) in that multiple hypotheses 
(models) are simultaneously evaluated and model fit assessed (Burnham & 
Anderson, 2002). Although several methods to assess model fit have been proposed 
(see Garamszegi, 2011, pg. 2), the most common method is based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike, 1998) and associated metrics such as the Quasi-
likelihood Information Criterion (QIC) adopted here. These methods estimate the 
amount of information contained in each model (i.e., how well the model predicts the 
dependent variable), with a lower value indicating increased model fit, with 
appropriate penalties for increased model complexity to prevent over-fitting 
(Burnham & Anderson, 2002).  
Use of these metrics permits comparison of multiple hypotheses in parallel, 
rather than stepwise selection of terms based on arbitrary p-value thresholds, as with 
frequentist approaches (Garamszegi, 2011). A distinct advantage of this IT approach 
is that model uncertainty can be quantified and utilized in downstream analysis 
(Grueber, Nakagawa, Laws, & Jamieson, 2011). Based on the information criterion 
used, Akaike weights can then be quantified for each of the candidate models. This 
is a value between 0 and 1 which can be interpreted as the probability that a given 
model is the best fit to the data (Symonds & Moussalli, 2011). Therefore, a model 
with an Akaike weight of 0.95 means that, of all models compared, there is a 95% 
chance that this is the best-fitting model. As this weight decreases there is less 
certainty that a given model is the best model, such that other models may be a 
better model fit (or that multiple models provide a similar fit).  
If there is uncertainty over which is the ‘best’ model, model averaging over a 
set of these ‘top models’ can be used to obtain parameter estimates which take this 
model uncertainty into consideration (Grueber et al., 2011). This procedure uses 
weighted parameter estimates, in that terms from weakly-predictive models (i.e., 
lower Akaike weights) are given lower weights than terms from models with greater 
predictive power (i.e., higher Akaike weights). We define the ‘top model set’ as any 
models within two information criterion values (i.e., two QIC values) of the best-fitting 
model (Grueber et al., 2011). We utilize a ‘zero method’ of model averaging, in which 
parameters absent in a subset of the top models are substituted with a value of ‘0’. 
This ‘zero method’ of model averaging is a more stringent method than the 
alternative ‘conditional method’ which only averages parameters over the models 
they appear in, while ignoring these parameters in top models in which they are 
absent. This ‘zero method’ therefore reduces the effect sizes of weakly predictive 
variables, meaning that the remaining predictive variables are those possessing the 
strongest association with the response variable, reducing the possibility of type I 
errors (false positives; Barton, 2015; Grueber et al., 2011).
IT approaches are likely to be most useful in multivariate analyses where 
several variables may be associated with a specific response (Symonds & Moussalli, 
2011), as is the case here with multiple hypotheses derived from several different 
theories examined in tandem to explore the evolutionary factors which influence 
human cooperation. 
Table S1: Number (and percentage) of individuals in each kinship category in the 
analysis (n=272, dyads=1,312).
Kinship Category Number of camp-mates (%)
Primary kin (PK) 172 (13%)
Distant kin (DK) 152 (12%)
Spouse 84 (6%)
Spouse’s primary kin/Primary 
kin’s spouse (SPK/PKS)
176 (13%)
Spouse’s distant kin/Other 
affines (SDK/OA)
526 (40%)
Non-relatives (NR) 202 (15%)
Table S2: Results of the model averaging procedure for sharing resources with 
camp-mates, displaying standardized and unstandardized coefficients (n=272, 
dyads=1,312). Coefficients are log-odd estimates, with 95% confidence intervals 
displayed in brackets. Variables in which confidence intervals do not pass through ‘0’ 
are highlighted in bold. Relative importance denotes the summed Akaike weight (wi) 
of each parameter in the top models used in model averaging, with a ‘1’ indicating 
that this term occurred in all top models.  Proximity does not appear here as no top 
model contained this variable. All models contain an ‘ego cooperative score’ variable 
(not displayed) to control for differences in amount given between individuals. 
Variable Std. Parameter Estimate (95% CI)
Unstd. Parameter 
Estimate (95% CI)
Relative 
Import. (wi)
Kinship (Baseline: Non-kin)
   Primary Kin 1.39 [0.85; 1.92] 1.39 [0.85; 1.92] 1
   Distant Kin 0.58 [0.04; 1.11] 0.58 [0.04; 1.11] 1
   Spouse’s Primary Kin/
      Primary Kin’s Spouse 0.19 [-0.31; 0.68] 0.19 [-0.31; 0.68] 1
   Spouse’s Distant Kin/ 
      Other Affines 0.06 [-0.34; 0.45] 0.06 [-0.34; 0.45] 1
   Spouse 0.17 [-0.47; 0.8] 0.17 [-0.47; 0.8] 1
Reciprocity (1=Yes) 0.52 [0.21; 0.83] 0.52 [0.21; 0.83] 1
Alter Cooperativeness -0.46 [-0.16; -0.75] -0.011 [-0.004; -0.018] 1
Cooperative Homophily 0.03 [-0.16; 0.22] 0.001 [-0.004; 0.005] 0.28
Ego Age -0.08 [-0.36; 0.19] -0.003 [-0.012; 0.007] N/A
Alter Age 0.4 [0.11; 0.68] 0.014 [0.004; 0.024] N/A
Age Difference 0.09 [-0.2; 0.38] 0.004 [-0.008; 0.016] N/A
Ego Sex (1=Male) 0.01 [-0.27; 0.28] 0.01 [-0.27; 0.28] N/A
Alter Sex (1=Male) -0.17 [-0.44; 0.1] -0.17 [-0.44; 0.1] N/A
Same Sex (1=No) -0.64 [-0.35; -0.92] -0.64 [-0.35; -0.92] N/A
Intercept -1.27 [-0.92; -1.61] 2.36 [1.64; 3.09] N/A
Table S3: Results of the model averaging procedure for sharing resources with 
camp-mates, using a logistic mixed-effects model with both givers and receivers as 
random effects (n=272, dyads=1,312). Coefficients are standardized log-odd 
estimates, with 95% confidence intervals displayed in brackets. Variables in which 
confidence intervals do not pass through ‘0’ (or do so only marginally) are highlighted 
in bold. Relative importance denotes the summed Akaike weight (wi) of each 
parameter in the top models used in model averaging, with a ‘1’ indicating that this 
term occurred in all top models. All models contain an ‘ego cooperative score’ 
variable (not displayed) to control for differences in amount given between 
individuals. The parameter estimates in this model are qualitatively identical to those 
in the GEE model (Table S2), demonstrating the robustness of these findings.
Variable Standardized Parameter Estimate (95% CI)
Relative 
Import. (wi)
Kinship (Baseline: Non-kin)
   Primary Kin 1.41 [0.74; 2.08] 1
   Distant Kin 0.64 [-0.02; 1.29] 1
   Spouse’s Primary Kin/
      Primary Kin’s Spouse 0.23 [-0.4; 0.86] 1
   Spouse’s Distant Kin/ 
      Other Affines 0.08 [-0.41; 0.57] 1
   Spouse 0.15 [-0.67; 0.97] 1
Reciprocity (1=Yes) 0.58 [0.21; 0.95] 1
Alter Cooperativeness -0.53 [-0.14; -0.91] 1
Proximity -0.05 [-0.32; 0.22] 0.26
Cooperative Homophily 0.04 [-0.2; 0.28] 0.25
Ego Age -0.11 [-0.43; 0.22] N/A
Alter Age 0.43 [0.06; 0.8] N/A
Age Difference 0.07 [-0.27; 0.41] N/A
Ego Sex (1=Male) -0.01 [-0.33; 0.31] N/A
Alter Sex (1=Male) -0.15 [-0.51; 0.21] N/A
Same Sex (1=No) -0.68 [-0.35; -1.01] N/A
Intercept -1.35 [-0.9; -1.8] N/A
Table S4: Frequency and percentage of answers given as to why individuals gave 
resources to others (answers=1,001).  Note that some answers included two 
categories (e.g., ‘Father’ and ‘has a kind heart’), in which case half a point was 
coded as ‘Genetic Kin’ and the other half as ‘Personal Qualities’.  
Category Example Answers Frequency (%)
Genetic Kin Father, Mother, Son 279 (27.9%)
Affinal Kin and 
Spouse Father-in-law, Brother-in-law, Spouse 163 (16.3%)
Non-Kin 
Relationship Friend, Neighbor, Companion 55.5 (5.5%)
Need-based/
Helping
Alter is/has; Old, Pregnant, Many children, 
Cannot work, No food.  To help them. 258.5 (25.8%)
Reciprocity When ego needs something alter is there, Alter shares with ego, If ego asks alter gives 94 (9.4%)
Personal Qualities Alter is/has; Good, A kind heart, Good in sharing, Chief 84.5 (8.4%)
Fairness/
Equality
Need to share, So everybody has some, So they 
have the same 12.5 (1.3%)
Other Varied, including; guilt, reasons related to the game, and ‘don’t know why’ 54 (5.4%)
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